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INSPIRING FUTURES


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Learning objectives

At the end of this section of the topic on ISA/IEC 62443 the learning will:

- define the elements of a comprehensive IACS CSMS.
- explain the concept of maturity levels and how to assess and improve the cybersecurity maturity of an IACS organisation.
- understand the requirements for security programme ratings, patch management, and security program requirements for service providers.
- gain insights into the guidance provided for IACS asset owners to help them implement and maintain a secure IACS environment.
- describe the security technologies and requirements for IACS systems, and the secure product development lifecycle for IACS components.

ISA/IEC 62443 Part 2: Policy and Procedure



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Part 2-1: Establishing an IACS Security Programme

- The standard applies to all organisations that own, operate, or maintain IACS.
- The standard also applies to all types of IACS, including:
 - Process Control Systems (PCS)
 - Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems
 - Distributed Control Systems (DCS)
 - Manufacturing Execution Systems (MES)
 - Industrial Automation Systems (IAS)


Part 2-1: Establishing an IACS Security Programme

Key Requirements


- Policy and organisation
- Resource management
- Process management
- Communication and cooperation

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Part 2-1: Categories of a CSMS



ISA/IEC 62443 relationship between parts



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Process to develop a CSMS High-level Establish Policy, Initiate a CSMS Organisational & programme Assessment Awareness Maintain CSMS Detailed Select and Risk Implement Assessment countermeasures

Process to develop a CSMS

Initiate a CSMS programme

- **Business rationale**
- **Develop CSMS scope** Involve stakeholders
- Obtain leadership commitment, support & funding

High-level Risk Assessment

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- Define methodology Identify risks
- Define methodology for assessing priority of risks
- Assess the priority of risks

Detailed Screen and prioritise Risk Assessment

- Inventory IACS systems, networks & devices
- Identify detailed vulnerabilities

Document results and rationale

Identify and prioritise associated risks

Establish Policy, Organisational & Awareness

countermeasures

Maintain

the

CSMS

- Create policies & procedures
- Implement policies & procedures
- Communicate policies **Develop training activities**
- Assign organisational responsibilities
- Establish risk tolerance Select and Select countermeasures Implement Implement countermeasures
 - Develop new or modify existing systems
 - Monitor legal and regulatory constraints Monitor industry practices
 - Monitor available countermeasures Monitor effectiveness of the CSMS
 - Audit compliance
 - Review the CSMS
 - Refine the CSMS

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Part 2-2: ICAS Security programme ratings

- Set of levels of security, from Category 0 (lowest) to Category 4 (highest).
- These requirements cover a wide range of areas, including:
 - Asset management
 - Communication security
 - Application security
 - Operational security
 - Maintenance security

Part 2-3: Patch Management

- Set of requirements for patch management, including:
 - Identifying and classifying vulnerabilities
 - Prioritising vulnerabilities
 - Deploying patches
 - Testing patches
 - Monitoring patch deployment
 - Remediating non-deployed patches

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Part 2-4: Security programme requirements for IACS service providers

- Part 2-4 applies to all organisations that provide IACS services such as:
 - Design and development of IACS
 - Manufacturing of IACS
 - Installation and commissioning of IACS
 - Maintenance and support of IACS
 - Operation and monitoring of IACS
 - Outsourcing of IACS services

Part 2-4: Security programme requirements for IACS service providers

- The standard also applies to organisations that provide services that are not directly related to IACS, but that could impact the security of IACS such as:
 - Networking and telecommunications
 - Security consulting
 - Vulnerability management
 - Security training and awareness

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Part 2-4: Security programme requirements for IACS service providers

Feature	ISA/IEC 62443-2-1	ISA/IEC 62443-2-4
Target audience	IACS owners and operators	IACS service providers
Focus	Establish and implement a CSMS	Establish and implement a cybersecurity programme for service providers
Scope	Policy and organisation, resource management, process management, and communication and cooperation	Policy and organisation, resource management, process management, and communication and cooperation

Part 2-4

- The security programmes implementing these requirements are expected to be independent of different releases of the products used in the automation solution.
- The requirements are defined in terms of the capabilities that these security programmes are required to provide.
- The standard recognises that security programmes evolve and that capabilities go
 through a life cycle of their own, often starting as completely manual and evolving
 over time to become more formal, more consistent, and more effective 62443-2-4
 addresses this issue of evolving capabilities by defining a maturity model to be
 used with the application of this standard.
- Service providers and asset owners should negotiate and agree on which of these required capabilities are to be provided and how.
- **Encourage service providers** to implement the required capabilities so they can be adaptable to a wide variety of asset owners.
- The maturity model also allows asset owners to understand the maturity of a specific service provider's capabilities better

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Part 2-4

- Part 2-4 is relevant for asset owners and addresses capabilities of service providers that may support or undermine the security maturity of asset owners.
- Contains security requirements for providers of integration and maintenance services for IACS.
- The standard specifies requirements for security capabilities for IACS service providers that they can offer to the asset owner during integration and maintenance activities of an automation solution.
- It is related to Part 2-1, which describes requirements for the security management system of the asset owner.
- Part 2-4 can be used by asset owners to request specific security capabilities from the service provider.
- Part 2-4 can be used by asset owners to determine whether or not a specific service provider's security program includes the capabilities that the asset owner needs.

Part 2-5: Guidance for ICAS asset owners

- Provides implementation guidance for ICAS asset owners on how they can improve the security of their assets.
- The standard provides guidance on a wide range of topics, including:
 - Asset identification
 - Asset classification
 - Asset protection
 - Asset management
 - Asset disposal

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Part 2-5: Guidance for ICAS asset owners

- The standard also provides guidance on how to implement the necessary security controls to protect IACS assets.
 These controls include:
 - Physical security
 - Environmental security
 - Data security
 - Network security
 - Application security
 - Operational security
 - Maintenance security

Part 2-5: Guidance for ICAS asset owners


- Additionally, the standard provides guidance on how to assess the effectiveness of the security controls, including:
 - Vulnerability assessments
 - Penetration testing
 - Incident response

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
ICAS Maturity compared to CMMI



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CMMI

ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3



Part 3-1 - Implement security technologies for IACS

- Technical specification that defines the requirements for securing IACS by providing guidance on how to implement security technologies for IACS.
- This is important because IACS are increasingly being targeted by cyberattacks.
- Assists organisations to significantly reduce their risk of cyberattacks and protect their IACS from harm.

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Part 3-1 - Implement security technologies for IACS

Key Requirements

- Network Segmentation
- Access Control
- Encryption
- IDS/IPS
- Honeypots
- SIEM

Part 3-1 - Implement security technologies for IACS

Security Requirements

- Availability
- Integrity
- Confidentiality
- Accessibility


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
Part 3-2 - Security risk assessment for system design

- defines the requirements for conducting security risk assessments for IACS:
 - Identify assets
 - Analyse threats
 - Evaluate vulnerabilities
 - Assess risk
- Also defines a set of security requirements for each step of the security risk assessment process.


Part 3-3 - System security requirements and security levels

• defines a 4-level security classification scheme for IACS:





ISA-99 Reference Model




Industrial Automation and Control Systems

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Security Levels SL 4: Protection against intentional violation using sophisticated means with extended resources, skills and motivation SL 3: Protection against intentional violation using sophisticated means with moderate resources, skills and motivation **SL 2**: Protection against intentional violation using simple means with low resources, skills and motivation SL 1: Protection against casual or coincidental violation SL 0: No specific requirements

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Security Level Controls

The following controls are mandated for SL4:

- Access Control Mechanisms
- Auditing and Logging
- Date Integrity Protection
- Configuration Management
- Identity and Access Management
- Vulnerability Management
- Security Awareness Training
- Segmentation
- Security Testing
- Incident Response

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
Security Level Types

SLs are grouped into three types:


- Target SLs (SL-T):
 - These are the desired level of security for an automation solution.
 - A System or Component can achieve SL-T natively without additional countermeasures.
- Achieved SLs (SL-A):
 - These are the actual level of security for an IACS.
 - The SL-A are determined as a result of Risk Assessment.
 - They are used to select products and design additional countermeasures during the integration phase of the IACS lifecycle.
- Capability SLs (SL-C):
 - These are the security levels that components or systems can provide when properly configured.

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Zones and Conduits



ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4



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Part 4-1 - Secure product development lifecycle

- Technical specification that defines the requirements the requirements for implementing a secure product development lifecycle for IACS.
- The specification describes the requirements for the Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) of OT System and Component products.

Part 4-1 - Secure product development lifecycle

Key Requirement Categories

- Planning
- Design
- Development
- Testing
- Deployment
- Operation
- Decommissioning

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Part 4-2 – Security Requirements for Components

- Provide guidance on how to select, install, and maintain secure IACS components through the definition of Common Cyber Security Constraints (CCSC).
- This is important because IACS components are often the weakest link in an IACS security posture.

Part 4-2 – Security Requirements for Components

Key Requirement Categories

- Identification and classification
- Security policy
- Vulnerability management
- Protection against unauthorised access
- Security updates
- The standard also defines a set of security constraints.

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Part 4-2 - Security Requirements for Components

Threat Modelling

- Systematic process to identify data flows, trust boundaries, attack vectors, and potential threats to the ICAS.
- The vendor must address any security issues that are identified in the threat modelling process before product release.
- The threat modelling process must be updated between releases and changes addressed before each release.


Part 4-2 - Security Requirements for Components

Common Cyber Security Constraints

- CCSC 1: describes that components must take into account the general security characteristics of the system in which they are used.
- CCSC 2: specifies that the technical requirements that the component cannot meet itself can be met by compensating countermeasures at system level.
- CCSC 3: requires that the Principal of Least Privilege (PoLP) is applied in the component.
- CCSC 4: requires that the component is developed and supported by a Part 4-1 compliant development processes.

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Dependencies




Summary


ISA/IEC 62443 series of standards


- Security for product development lifecycle: provides guidance on how to secure IACS products throughout the product development lifecycle, from requirements gathering to deployment and decommissioning.
- Security risk assessment: provides guidance on how to identify, assess, and prioritise security risks in IACS environments.
- Security levels: defines a four-level security classification system for IACS assets.
- Security for components: provides guidance on how to secure IACS components, such as PLCs and HMIs.
- Security of communication networks: provides guidance on how to secure IACS communication networks, such as SCADA networks.


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












Question 1

- Select the incorrect statement from the following:
- ☐ SL-0: No specific requirements or security protection are necessary
- ☐ SL-1: Protection against casual or coincidental violation
- SL-3: Protection against intentional violation using simple means with low resources, generic skills, and low motivation
- □ SL-4: Protection against intentional violation using sophisticated means with extended resources, IACS-specific skills and high motivation

Question 1

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Question 2

- Which type of security level defines what a component or system is capable of meeting?:
- □ Capability security level
- □ Achieved security level
- □ Design security level
- □ Target security level



Question 2

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Question 3

- Which of the ISA/IEC 62443 standards focuses on the processes of developing securing products?:
- ☐ ISA/IEC 62443-1-1
- ☐ ISA/IEC 62443-3-2
- ☐ ISA/IEC 62443-3-3
- ☐ ISA/IEC 62443-4-1

Question 3

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- ▼ ISA/IEC 62443-1-1
- ISA/IEC 62443-3-2
- ISA/IEC 62443-3-3
- ISA/IEC 62443-4-1



Question 4

- Which of the following ISA-99 Reference model is named correctly?:
- ☐ Level 1 Supervisory Control
- ☐ Level 2 Quality Control
- □ Level 1 Manufacturing Operations
- □ Level 1 Process

Question 4

- Which of the following ISA-99 Reference model is named correctly?:
- Level 1 Supervisory Control
- Level 2 Quality Control
- ✓ Level 3 Manufacturing Operations
- Level 4 Process



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Question 5

- Which of the ISA 62443 standards focuses on patch management?:
- ☐ ISA/IEC 62443-1-3
- □ ISA/IEC 62443-2-3
- ☐ ISA/IEC 62443-3-1
- ☐ ISA/IEC 62443-4-1

Question 5

- Which of the ISA 62443 standards focuses on patch management?:
- ▼ ISA/IEC 62443-1-3
- ISA/IEC 62443-2-3
- ISA/IEC 62443-3-1
- ▼ ISA/IEC 62443-4-1



Learning objectives

- Define the elements of a comprehensive IACS CSMS. ✓
- · Explain the concept of maturity levels and how to assess and
- providers. <
- components. <

Innealtóir Cairte agus Léachtóir Sinsearach improve the cybersecurity maturity of an IACS organisation. ✓ E diarmuid.obriain@tus.ie | W tus.ie • Understand the requirements for security programme ratings, Campas Maoilis, Páirc Maoilis, CISSP* Luimneach, V94 EC5T, Éire patch management, and security program requirements for service Thank you • Gain insights into the guidance provided for IACS asset owners to help them implement and maintain a secure IACS environment. < • Describe the security technologies and requirements for IACS systems, and the secure product development lifecycle for IACS **INSPIRING FUTURES** setu.ie 61

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