

South East Energy Agency  
 Cybersecurity Incident Response TTX | 2 July 2026

Assessment Category	Maximum Points	Score Awarded	Key Facilitator Observations / Notes
Pillar 1: Legal Line	4		
Pillar 2: Financial Continuity	4		
Pillar 3: Comms Strategy	4		
Pillar 4: CNI Resilience	4		
<b>Total Board Score</b>	16		

Overall Maturity Level: (0-5: Weak / 6-11: Capable / 12-16: Resilient)

Pillar 1: Legal Line	
0 – 1	Failed to recognise the 72-hour GDPR countdown window; delayed or avoided notifying the DPC out of fear of public exposure; attempted to self-investigate without triggering national frameworks.
2 – 3	Actively tracked the GDPR clock; agreed to submit an initial "Incomplete Notification" to the DPC within 72 hours; correctly identified that the incident must be reported to the NCSC-IE portal under NIS2 timelines.
4	All of the above, plus established strict protocols to prevent technical data leaks to the media, protecting active forensic telemetry and proving active corporate governance in the board minutes.
Pillar 2: Financial Continuity	
0 – 1	Paralysed by the financial freeze; failed to address contractor cash flow issues; exposed member County Council financial environments to potential contagion by refusing to isolate shared digital paths.
2 – 3	Formulated a temporary manual or secure offline bypass mechanism with the SEAI to handle critical, high-priority project grant payouts; isolated shared financial infrastructure between SEEA and the four Local Authorities.
4	All of the above, plus officially ratified a Force Majeure directive to legally shield community contractors and SECs from litigation or penalties due to missed carbon target timelines caused by the breach.
Pillar 3: Comms Strategy	
0 – 1	Allowed individual county representatives to issue separate, uncoordinated statements to local media; remained entirely silent to contractors, fueling community panic; publicly confirmed ransom details or speculated on the threat actor.
2 – 3	Enforced the "Single Voice Rule" routing all regional media to the central SEEA press office; provided structured, pragmatic updates to SECs acknowledging delays without over-committing to premature financial liabilities.
4	Crafted highly targeted messaging boundaries for distinct audiences—reassuring the four County Chiefs that networks were insulated, while keeping public media releases factual, high-level, and completely silent on specific ransom metrics.
Pillar 4: CNI Resilience	
0 – 1	Treated the event purely as a temporary IT glitch; focused solely on getting back to the "old way" of working without changing network architecture or evaluating systemic climate target risks.
2 – 3	Recognised that a failure in SEEA's digital paths paralyses the region's climate infrastructure; mandated a security review of all shared data links with Carlow, Kilkenny, Wexford, and Waterford councils before reconnecting.
4	Approved a forward-looking governance directive allocating capital for a "Zero-Trust" architectural design; decoupled the ISO 50001 energy auditing database from financial environments; mandated a formal risk mapping of how regional energy data delays ripple into national grid (ESB/EirGrid) calculations.