Laboratory #5

Security Operations Centre (SOC)

Operation ShadowNet: Rapid Response

Dr Diarmuid Ó Briain Version: 1.0



Ollscoil Teicneolaíochta an Oirdheiscirt

South East Technological University Copyright © 2025 C²S Consulting

Licenced under the EUPL, Version 1.2 or – as soon they will be approved by the European Commission - subsequent versions of the EUPL (the "Licence");

You may not use this work except in compliance with the Licence.

You may obtain a copy of the Licence at:

https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/custom-page/attachment/eupl_v1.2_en.pdf

Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software distributed under the Licence is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.

See the Licence for the specific language governing permissions and limitations under the Licence.

Dr Diarmuid Ó Briain



Table of Contents

1	Scenario	5
2	Objectives	5
3	Roles and Responsibilities	5
4	Communication/Documentation	5
5	Exercise Materials (Simplified):	6
5.1	A short, focused log file (e.g., web server access logs)	6
5.2	A single network connection log showing the malicious outbound connection	7
5.3	A screenshot of the affected web server showing encrypted files	8
5.4	A simplified network diagram showing the webserver	8
5.5	A simple incident log template	9
6	Key Points for the Exercise	11
6 7	Key Points for the Exercise Who/what generates the Incident Log in the SOC	
		.11
7	Who/what generates the Incident Log in the SOC	.11 13
7 8	Who/what generates the Incident Log in the SOC Exercise Phases Rapid Triage and Identification	. 11 13 13
7 8 8.1	Who/what generates the Incident Log in the SOC Exercise Phases Rapid Triage and Identification Immediate Containment	. 11 . 13 .13 .13
7 8 8.1 8.2	Who/what generates the Incident Log in the SOC Exercise Phases Rapid Triage and Identification Immediate Containment	. 11 13 13 13 13
7 8 8.1 8.2 8.3	Who/what generates the Incident Log in the SOC Exercise Phases Rapid Triage and Identification Immediate Containment Key Findings and Documentation	.11 13 13 13 13 13 13
7 8.1 8.2 8.3 9	Who/what generates the Incident Log in the SOC Exercise Phases Rapid Triage and Identification Immediate Containment	.11 13 13 13 13 13 13 13

Illustration Index

Figure 1: Screenshot of Affected Server	8
Figure 2: Network Diagram	8

This page is intentionally blank

Operation ShadowNet: Rapid Response

1 Scenario

A mid-sized e-commerce company, "*GlobalGadgets*," has detected a ransomware attack. A critical web server is showing signs of encryption, and a single, suspicious outbound network connection has been identified.

2 Objectives

- Rapidly identify the scope of the ransomware attack.
- Isolate the affected server.
- Identify the malicious network connection.
- Document key findings and actions.

3 Roles and Responsibilities

- Incident Commander
 - Directs the response and makes key decisions.
 - Tracks progress and time.
- Network/Log Analyst
 - Analyse provided logs and network data.
 - Identify the malicious IP and the affected server.
- Endpoint/Forensics Analyst
 - Focus on the webserver, and quickly identify the processes encrypting files.
 - Isolate the infected webserver.

4 Communication/Documentation

- Log key findings.
- Document isolation steps.
- Communicate findings to the Incident commander.

5 Exercise Materials (Simplified):

5.1 A short, focused log file (e.g., web server access logs)

Timestamp, Source IP, Destination IP, Port, Protocol, Action, User Agent, URI 2025-03-25 10:00:01,192.168.1.10,192.168.1.50,80,TCP,ALLOW,Mozilla/5.0, /index.html 2025-03-25 10:00:05,192.168.1.10,192.168.1.50,80,TCP,ALLOW,Mozilla/5.0, /products.html 2025-03-25 10:01:12,192.168.1.10,192.168.1.50,80,TCP,ALLOW,Mozilla/5.0, /order.php 2025-03-25 10:02:30,192.168.1.10,192.168.1.50,80,TCP,ALLOW,Mozilla/5.0, /image.jpg 2025-03-25 10:03:45,192.168.1.10,192.168.1.50,80,TCP,ALLOW,Mozilla/5.0, /admin/login.php 2025-03-25 10:04:15,192.168.1.10,192.168.1.50,80,TCP,ALLOW,Mozilla/5.0, /admin/dashboard.php 2025-03-25 10:05:22,192.168.1.10,192.168.1.50,443,TCP,ALLOW,Mozilla/5.0, /api/upload.php 2025-03-25 10:06:00,192.168.1.10,192.168.1.50,443,TCP,ALLOW,Mozilla/5.0, /api/process.php 2025-03-25 10:07:18,192.168.1.10,192.168.1.50,443,TCP,ALLOW,Mozilla/5.0, /api/download.php 2025-03-25 10:08:35,192.168.1.10,192.168.1.50,443,TCP,ALLOW,Mozilla/5.0, /api/encrypt.php 2025-03-25 10:09:10,192.168.1.10,192.168.1.50,443,TCP,ALLOW,Mozilla/5.0, /api/encrypt.php 2025-03-25 10:09:45,192.168.1.10,192.168.1.50,443,TCP,ALLOW,Mozilla/5.0, /api/encrypt.php 2025-03-25 10:10:00,192.168.1.10,192.168.1.50,443,TCP,ALLOW,Mozilla/5.0, /api/encrypt.php 2025-03-25 10:10:15,192.168.1.10,192.168.1.50,443,TCP,ALLOW,Mozilla/5.0, /api/encrypt.php 2025-03-25 10:10:30,192.168.1.10,192.168.1.50,443,TCP,ALLOW,Mozilla/5.0, /api/encrypt.php 2025-03-25 10:11:00,192.168.1.50,198.51.100.10,5555,TCP,ALLOW,Unknown, -

Explanation and Points of Interest:

- **192.168.1.50:** This is the web server.
- **192.168.1.10:** This is a client accessing the web server.
- 198.51.100.10: This is the malicious external IP.
- Port 443: HTTPS traffic, potentially hiding malicious activity.
- **/api/encrypt.php:** This URI is highly suspicious, indicating a possible encryption routine.
- **5555:** An unusual high port, potentially used for command-and-control.
- "Unknown" User Agent and "-": This is unusual, and could be an indicator of malicious traffic.
- The repetitive nature of the encrypt.php calls is a huge red flag.

How to Use It:

- This log file provides a clear timeline of events.
- Students should quickly identify the suspicious /api/encrypt.php calls and the unusual outbound connection to 198.51.100.10:5555.
- This quickly shows the webserver (192.168.1.50) is compromised, and is reaching out to a suspicious external IP.
- This log is short and focused, allowing for rapid analysis in the limited time.

5.2 A single network connection log showing the malicious outbound connection.

Timestamp, Source IP, Source Port, Destination IP, Destination Port, Protocol, Bytes Sent, Bytes Received, Connection State 2025-03-25 09:55:00,192.168.1.100,54321,192.168.1.1,80,TCP,1024,512,ESTABLISHED 2025-03-25 09:56:15,192.168.1.101,55678,192.168.1.10,22,TCP,256,128,ESTABLISHED 2025-03-25 09:57:30,192.168.1.102,56789,192.168.1.20,53,UDP,64,64,ESTABLISHED 2025-03-25 09:58:45,192.168.1.103,57890,192.168.1.30,80,TCP,2048,1024,ESTABLISHED 2025-03-25 09:59:00,192.168.1.104,58901,192.168.1.40,443,TCP,4096,2048,ESTABLISHED 2025-03-25 10:00:00,192.168.1.105,59012,192.168.1.50,80,TCP,512,256,ESTABLISHED 2025-03-25 10:01:15,192.168.1.106,60123,192.168.1.60,22,TCP,128,64,ESTABLISHED 2025-03-25 10:02:30,192.168.1.107,61234,192.168.1.70,53,UDP,64,64,ESTABLISHED 2025-03-25 10:03:45,192.168.1.108,62345,192.168.1.80,80,TCP,1024,512,ESTABLISHED 2025-03-25 10:04:00,192.168.1.109,63456,192.168.1.90,443,TCP,2048,1024,ESTABLISHED 2025-03-25 10:05:15,192.168.1.110,64567,192.168.1.100,80,TCP,512,256,ESTABLISHED 2025-03-25 10:06:30,192.168.1.111,65678,192.168.1.110,22,TCP,128,64,ESTABLISHED 2025-03-25 10:07:45,192.168.1.112,66789,192.168.1.120,53,UDP,64,64,ESTABLISHED 2025-03-25 10:08:00,192.168.1.113,67890,192.168.1.130,80,TCP,1024,512,ESTABLISHED 2025-03-25 10:09:15,192.168.1.114,68901,192.168.1.140,443,TCP,2048,1024,ESTABLISHED 2025-03-25 10:10:30,192.168.1.115,69012,192.168.1.150,80,TCP,512,256,ESTABLISHED 2025-03-25 10:11:00,192.168.1.50,49512,198.51.100.10,5555,TCP,1280,64,ESTABLISHED 2025-03-25 10:12:15,192.168.1.116,70123,192.168.1.160,22,TCP,128,64,ESTABLISHED 2025-03-25 10:13:30,192.168.1.117,71234,192.168.1.170,53,UDP,64,64,ESTABLISHED 2025-03-25 10:14:45,192.168.1.118,72345,192.168.1.180,80,TCP,1024,512,ESTABLISHED

Explanation:


- **Timestamp:** 2025-03-25 10:11:00 Correlates with the suspicious activity in the web server logs.
- Source IP: 192.168.1.50 The compromised web server.
- Source Port: 49512 A high, ephemeral port.
- **Destination IP:** 198.51.100.10 The malicious external IP.
- **Destination Port:** 5555 An unusual high port, often used for custom applications or malicious traffic.
- Protocol: TCP A reliable connection protocol.
- Bytes Sent/Received: Indicates data transfer, confirming communication.
- · Connection State: ESTABLISHED Confirms an active connection.

5.3 A screenshot of the affected web server showing encrypted files.

	- Info
	Your important files were encrypted on this computer: photos, videos, documents, etc. You can verify this by click on see files and try to open them.
	Encryption was produced using unique public key RSA-4096 generated for this computer. To decrypt files, you need to obtain private key.
Your files will be lost	The single copy of the private key, which will allow you to decrypt the files, is located on a secret server on the Internet, the server will destroy the key within 72 hours after encryption completed. After that, nobody and never will be able to restore files.]
without payment on:	To retrieve the private key, you need to pay 0.5 bitcoins.
25/03/2025 10:15:00 AM	Click proceed to payment to obtain private key.
	Any attempt to remove or damage this software will lead to immediate private key destruction by server.

Figure 1: Screenshot of Affected Server

- File extensions: Encrypted files often have extensions appended by the ransomware (e.g., ".locked", ".encrypted", ".[ransomware name]").
- File icons: Encrypted files might have different icons than normal files.
- File sizes: Encrypted files might have unexpected sizes.
- **Ransom note:** A text file might be present with instructions from the attackers.



5.4 A simplified network diagram showing the webserver

Explanation:

- Internet: Represents the external network.
- Firewall: The security boundary between the internal and external networks.
- **Switch/Router:** The network device that connects the internal devices.
- Client (192.168.1.10): A typical user on the internal network.
- Web Server (192.168.1.50): The target of the ransomware attack.

5.5 A simple incident log template

Incident Log

Incident ID: SHADOWNET-20231027-001

Date: 2025-03-25

Time: 10:15 UTC

Reported By: Automated Alert System

1. Initial Report

- **10:15 UTC:** Automated alert triggered by unusual network traffic and file system modifications on web server 192.168.1.50.
- Alert details: High CPU utilisation, encrypted file extensions detected, outbound connection to 198.51.100.10:5555.

2. Triage and Analysis (10:15 - 10:30 UTC)

- **10:16 UTC:** Incident Commander assigned roles to Network/Log Analysts, Endpoint/Forensics Analysts, and Communication/Documentation team.
- 10:20 UTC: Network/Log Analysts confirmed outbound connection to 198.51.100.10:5555, TCP, established state.
- 10:25 UTC: Endpoint/Forensics Analysts confirmed file encryption on 192.168.1.50, /api/encrypt.php identified in web server logs as source of encryption.
- 10:28 UTC: Network/Log Analysts confirmed malicious IP address is not within internal network range.

3. Containment (10:30 - 10:50 UTC)

- 10:32 UTC: Endpoint/Forensics Analysts initiated isolation of web server 192.168.1.50 from the network.
- 10:35 UTC: Firewall rules updated to block all traffic to/from 198.51.100.10.
- 10:40 UTC: Communication/Documentation team began compiling incident report and communication log.
- 10:45 UTC: Verified network isolation of web server 192.168.1.50.
- 4. Key Findings (10:50 11:00 UTC)
 - Ransomware infection confirmed on web server 192.168.1.50.
 - Malicious external IP: 198.51.100.10, port 5555.
 - Encryption initiated via /api/encrypt.php script.

• Webserver network traffic was reaching out to the malicious external IP.

5. Actions Taken

- Web server 192.168.1.50 isolated from the network.
- Firewall rules implemented to block malicious IP 198.51.100.10.
- Incident documentation initiated.

6. Next Steps

- Forensic analysis of affected web server.
- Ransomware identification and analysis.
- Data recovery planning.
- Post-incident review and lessons learned.

7. Communication Log

- 10:20 UTC: Internal SOC channel: "Suspicious outbound connection detected from web server."
- 10:35 UTC: Internal SOC channel: "Firewall rules updated to block malicious IP."
- 10:55 UTC: Incident Commander to SOC Team: "Incident summary being compiled."

8. Attachments

- Web server access logs (excerpt).
- Network connection logs (excerpt).
- Screenshot of encrypted files.
- Network diagram.

6 Key Points for the Exercise

- This diagram clearly shows the web server's position in the network.
- Students can quickly understand the potential impact of a compromise on the web server.
- The diagram is simple, and easily understood, which is important for the time constraints of the exercise.
- The diagram shows the clear path that the malicious traffic took, from the internet, through the firewall, to the webserver.

7 Who/what generates the Incident Log in the SOC

The incident log is typically a combination of both human input and machinegenerated data. It's not exclusively one or the other. Here's a breakdown:

1. Human Input:

- Analyst Notes: SOC analysts are responsible for documenting their observations, actions, and decisions. This includes:
 - Timelines of events.
 - Analysis findings.
 - Communication logs.
 - Rationale for actions taken.
 - Lessons learned.
- **Manual Data Entry:** Some information might need to be manually entered into the incident management system, such as:
 - Contact information for affected parties.
 - Descriptions of unusual behaviour.
 - Summaries of conversations.

2. Machine-Generated Data:

- Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) Systems: These systems automatically collect and aggregate logs from various sources (firewalls, IDS/IPS, servers, etc.). They can:
 - Generate alerts based on predefined rules.
 - Record timestamps and source/destination IPs.
 - Correlate events and identify patterns.
- Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) Tools: These tools provide detailed information about endpoint activity, including:
 - Process execution.
 - File modifications.
 - Network connections.
- Automated Logging: Many systems and applications automatically generate logs that are captured by the incident management system.
- **Ticketing Systems:** These systems often automatically record actions performed on tickets, and time stamps.

In Summary:

- A modern SOC uses a blend of both. Machines provide the raw data, and humans provide the context, analysis, and decision-making.
- It is very important that a human reviews the machine data, to avoid false positives, and to add context.
- Incident management systems are designed to facilitate this combination, allowing analysts to easily add their notes and annotations to machinegenerated logs.

In essence, machines provide the raw material, and humans craft the narrative.

8 Exercise Phases

8.1 Rapid Triage and Identification

- Incident Commander distributes materials and assigns roles.
- Teams quickly analyse the provided data.
- Identify the affected web server and the malicious IP address.

8.2 Immediate Containment

- Endpoint/Forensics Analysts isolate the affected web server (simulated).
- Network/Log Analysts confirm the malicious IP address.
- Communication/Documentation team logs all actions.

8.3 Key Findings and Documentation

- Teams consolidate their findings.
- Communication/Documentation team prepares a brief incident summary.
- Incident Commander reports on the key findings and containment steps.

9 Exercise Execution

9.1 Briefing

- Quickly introduce the scenario and objectives.
- Assign roles and distribute materials.

9.2 Execution

- Students work rapidly to analyse data and take action.
- Facilitator provides minimal guidance, emphasising speed.

9.3 Debriefing

- Briefly review the team's actions and findings.
- Discuss the importance of rapid response.